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It is tempting to think that the influence of economics in jurisprudence
is confined to those who style themselves adherents of "The Economic
Analysis of Law" (EAL). But the methods of economic analysis have had
an influence in legal studies that is in fact much wider than that. Partly
this is because those who write in contemporary political philosophy find
it necessary to be economically much more literate (and numerate) than
they used to be. Opening a recent book on justice, democracy or moral
obligation, one is as likely to be confronted by an indifference curve, a
game theory matrix, or an Edgeworth box as by a piece of ordinary lan-
guage analysis. Since jurisprudence is a part of political philosophy, it is
bound to be affected by the way philosophers have opened the boundaries
of their discipline to these other influences.
Partly, it is because economics is seen today as comprising much more
than the narrow attempt to model general equilibrium or the decision-
making of firms and households. To understand those topics, economists
postulate a type of human agent who seeks rationally to maximize the
satisfaction of his own wants in a context where others are engaged in a
similar enterprise, against a finite stock of resources. That simple image of
agent-as-maximizer proved remarkably fertile as economists were able to
model interactions among very large numbers of people using the most
modest assumptions, and to generate abstract results that were in fact
quite powerful and interesting when applied to the messier reality of com-
merce, consumption and production in modern capitalist societies. Given
that success, it was natural to try to extend these models of human choice
and interaction into other fields and to apply them to other problems such
as conflict-resolution, voting, adjudication, the formation of public policy,
legislation, constitution-building, and so on.
The results of extending what has become known, at a general level, as
the rational choice approach have not always been felicitous: Sometimes
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we obscure more than we illuminate by cramming the terms of a problem
into the narrow framework of individual utility-maximization. But the
model allows us to say some of what we want to say much more precisely
and pellucidly than we were able to before, and often this is the case even
where we are convinced that "there are aspects of a problem that rational
choice cannot capture. So, for example, it is impossible to understand
much of the modern discussion of the moral obligation to obey the law if
one cannot distinguish between a prisoner's dilemma and a co-ordination
game. The game theoretic framework may not capture the sense of patri-
otic duty that motivates many citizens in their support for the law, but it
clarifies for us the role that such a motivation may play by exposing the
limits and paradoxes in the interplay of more prudential or self-interested
motivations.
In comparison with this general influence of economic or rational choice
methods, EAL is a rather narrow phenomenon. It seeks to characterize
certain areas of law in terms of the pursuit of efficiency. Rights are to be
assigned in a way that promotes the efficient use of resources. In some
cases this assignment will be the natural result of parties' dealings with
one another: If a right is not already assigned to the person who can use it
most productively, he should be in a position to purchase it from someone
making a less productive use and still be in a position to derive advantage
from the purchase. However, in cases where such dealings are impeded by
transaction costs, it is the task of a court to determine how the rights
would have been transferred apart from those costs and to assign them
accordingly. So understood, EAL raises but does not settle a number of
important questions. Why is the promotion of efficiency to be taken as the
aim of the legal process? Why not justice or the maximization of utility or
some other value that requires us to go beyond efficiency (however that is
understood)? What reason is there to suppose (even within a rational
choice framework) that judges will pursue this value and this value only?
Crudely, what's in it for them? Moreover, what reason is there to suppose
that this is what all people will want their courts to do? Is the promotion
of efficiency also the task of legislation as well as judicial decision-
making? Since the idea of efficiency presupposes a distribution of re-
sources (and since it is evidently the task of law to endorse such a distri-
bution as well as the transactions that flow from it), how are the values of
distributive justice to be related to the pursuit of efficiency? Many of these
questions can be addressed in terms of rational choice (broadly conceived).
But few of them are addressed in the writings we associate with EAL.
Jules Coleman is not an adherent (or certainly he is a far from whole-
hearted adherent) of EAL. A number of the papers collected in Markets,
Morals and the Law' contain trenchant criticisms of that approach. But
1. J. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW (1988) [hereinafter referred to by page
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his work as a whole bears tribute to the fertility of the economic method
in legal and political philosophy. He knows the concepts and the tech-
niques of rational choice theory, he is familiar with the important philo-
sophical problems in law and politics, and he is more sensitive than most
writers to dangers of sloppy or negligent use of the former to obscure
rather than illuminate the latter. For example, we all know that "effi-
ciency" is both a crucial and an ambiguous term in economic analy-
sis-ambiguous, that is, between several perfectly well-defined meanings
(such as Pareto-optimality, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and the maximization
of interpersonally measurable utility). Much of the time, its use as a cen-
tral concept in EAL plays on that ambiguity, making the approach seem
stronger and more interesting than in fact it is. Coleman knows the ambi-
guities inside out, and he can spot an equivocation miles away. If readers
get nothing else from his book, they will come away with these definitions
ringing clearly in their heads, and their thought will be imbued with the
lesson that the concept of efficiency that is actually used in the economic
analysis must be the same as the one that is used to advertise its
attractions.'
Alarkets, Morals and the Law is a wide-ranging collection of papers,
covering topics as diverse as Ronald Dworkin's critique of legal positiv-
ism, the difference between an auction and a competitive market, strict
liability in torts, and the theory of voting in liberal democracies. All of the
papers were previously published between 1976 and 1987 in law reviews
and moral philosophy journals. Two of them, "Rethinking the Theory of
Legal Rights" and "Morality and the Theory of Rational Choice," were
co-authored with Jody Kraus, and one, "Justice in Settlements," with
Charles Silver. That does not detract from the thematic unity of the col-
lection, though it has to be said that the co-authored essays have been
imperfectly edited for their inclusion here, slipping disconcertingly as they
do from first person singular to first person plural in their presentation of
arguments.
The thirteen papers are grouped into four sections: "Law and Moral-
ity," "Law and Economics," "Torts, Crimes and Settlements" and "Mar-
kets, Morals and Politics." I cannot hope to do justice to them all in one
review, and I shall concentrate my critical comments on one paper from
only]. Throughout the book, Coleman takes the writings of Richard Posner as the main target of his
criticisms of EAL, particularly R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1986), Posner, A Theory
fNtghgenre, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972), and Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal The-
ory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). For reasons of space, I shall not in this review consider whether
Judge Posner actually holds the views attributed to him by Coleman. My interest is in the force of
Coleman's arguments themselves.
2. One possible disadvantage of collecting a set of previously published essays into one book is that
the same concepts get introduced and re-introduced to the reader over and over again, each time as
though they were new. Coleman defines and distinguishes the notions of Pareto-superiority, Pareto-
optimality, and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency near the beginning of each of the six chapters that discuss
them.
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each section. That focus is not meant to suggest that the other essays are
not worth reading. Also, my criticisms will pay tribute more to the re-
viewer's task of engaging the author than to any overall evaluation of the
merits of the collection. Suffice to say that anyone who wants to talk intel-
ligently about the application of economics and the theory of rational
choice to law and jurisprudence ought to read these papers carefully.
I have chosen the targets of my discussion so that they hang together in
two parts. Sections I and II examine a couple of problems in Coleman's
discussion of tort law: (1) his critique of the EAL account of the role
played by liability rules in the protection of entitlements, and (2) his dis-
cussion of corrective justice. In Sections III and IV, I focus on Coleman's
discussion of some wider issues in economic theory: (3) his critique of
various attempts to show that economic efficiency is a desirable goal for
the law to pursue, and (4) his discussion of recent attempts to apply ra-
tional choice theory to the initial allocation of entitlements as well as to
their subsequent exchange.
I. RIGHTS AND LIABILITY RULES
How should we think about the liability to pay damages in tort? Sup-
pose someone rams his car recklessly into mine, I sue him, and he pays
me damages. Does that payment render his action retrospectively permis-
sible? Does it make his ramming me legitimate in exactly the sense in
which it would have been legitimated ex ante by, for example, my agree-
ment to participate in a "Demolition Derby?" Should ex ante agreement
and the payment of damages ex post be regarded as alternative ways of
legitimately transferring entitlements?
In a chapter entitled "Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights," Cole-
man and Kraus argue that the answer to these questions is often "No." It
is clear that, in terms of the famous Calabresi-Melamed framework,3 the
rights protected in tort characteristically involve elements of both "prop-
erty rules" (invasions may be legitimated ex ante by consent) and "liabil-
ity rules" (compensation must be paid for unwanted invasions). But the
combination of these elements need not be seen as involving alternative
modes of legitimation. Coleman and Kraus believe that for many torts, the
combination may take the following form:
(Y) If the content of B's entitlement is given by a combination of
property and liability rules, then B has two legitimate claims: One is
3. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972). A right is protected by a properly rule if the right-holder
may, with the support of society, enjoin any infringement that takes place without his consent; a right
is protected by an inalienability rule if it is legally impossible for even an apparently willing right-
holder to sell or give away his entitlement; and a right is protected with a liability rule if a person




to ex ante agreement as both necessary and sufficient for legitimate
transfer; the other is to recompense in the event A imposes a transfer
on him after either negotiations fail or A forgoes them."
The function of damages in this analysis is to bolster and reinforce the
prohibition on unwanted (and therefore illegitimate) invasions. The rules
in (3') protect a sphere of control or autonomy for B, by requiring A to
seek B's consent if he wants to invade B's entitlement. But they recognize
that A may not always abide by the rules, and so they give B the right to
damages as something of a second line of defense. According to Coleman
and Kraus, only something along the lines of (3') will be able to capture
our sense that the reckless driver in the example given at the beginning of
this section has done something wrong even if he was always willing to
pay compensation. Indeed, as they note, since certain intentional torts
warrant punitive damages and perhaps even criminal sanctions, no ac-
count will be adequate if it always allows the payment of compensation to
legitimate an invasion ex post.
This is not to say that there are no cases where the payment of damages
confers ex post legitimacy. A person may be permitted to engage nonneg-
ligently in a dangerous activity like blasting provided he pays compensa-
tion to anyone who suffers damage thereby.5 Coleman and Kraus' point is
simply that we cannot infer from the fact that the payment of damages
sometimes legitimates an invasion to the claim that it is always understood
to do so.
The latter claim, they believe, is suggested by much of what is said in
the EAL approach to tort law. Adherents of EAL are driven to this posi-
tion, which Coleman and Kraus describe as "ludicrous," 6 by the way in
which they think about compensation. The line of thought goes as follows.
Suppose full compensation is understood as a transfer from the invader
to the right-bearer which is sufficiently large to leave the latter at the
same level of utility as he was just before the invasion took place, and
suppose that the invader would rather invade the right and pay that level
of compensation than not invade the right at all. Then it is natural to
think of the whole transaction (invasion plus compensation) as a Pareto-
improvement: It leaves the right-bearer as well off as he was before (the
function of compensation), and it leaves the invader better off even having
paid the compensation (otherwise he would not have invaded the right
knowing that compensation would be due). It is natural to say that a
transaction which is a Pareto-improvement cannot possibly be illegitimate:
Who can possibly object, if both parties are at least as well off as they
were before?
4. P. 42 (emphasis in original).
5. P. 50; see Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250 N.E.2d 31, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1969).
6. P. 50.
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Coleman and Kraus' response is to insist that many rights are intended
to protect individual autonomy or individual control over resources, and
not just a certain level of individual well-being. The illegitimacy of some
such transactions (for example, in the reckless driver case) is simply that
my entitlement was invaded "without my consent, irrespective of my level
of well-being. The proponent of EAL may respond that the acceptance of
compensation amounts retrospectively to consent, but Coleman and Kraus
insist that this makes nonsense of a perfectly coherent thought about the
matter, namely, that an injured party may demand and accept damages as
a recompense for having been wronged rather than as a way of establish-
ing that he was not, in the end, wronged at all.'
I believe they are right about this, but they do underestimate the power
of the EAL line in two ways. First, they do not take enough notice of the
definitional connection between "adequate compensation" and "consent"
that EAL insists on. There is no way in economics to establish that the
right-bearer's utility has remained at the same level (after the invasion
plus the payment of compensation) except to say that this is the least he
would have accepted to consent to the invasion. That is what adequate
compensation means, in the EAL approach. The other point is that Cole-
man and Kraus leave it a little unclear how the level of compensation is to
be fixed, if it is not intended as a surrogate for consent. If it is understood
simply as a sanction, why not fix it at whatever level is necessary to deter
the invader rather than at the level necessary to secure the ex ante utility
of the right-bearer?8
In all of this, Coleman and Kraus are developing a general theory of
what it is to have a legal right. Since they want to argue that the liability
to pay damages may or may not be a way of legitimating an unwanted
transfer, they need to establish a conception of legal rights which does not
identify rights analytically with either the application of property rules or
the securing of a certain level of well-being through the application of
liability rules. Classical liberals have sometimes argued that rights, by def-
inition, can never be legitimately infringed without consent.9 Adherents of
EAL have often responded by insisting that rights are nothing but ways of
securing levels of utility, so payment of compensation is all there is to
respecting a right. Coleman and Kraus seek to chart a middle course, in
which the concept of rights begs as few questions as possible about the
transaction structure that a particular right may involve.
I believe their general theory of rights is a useful one. It has a lot in
common with what is known as the "Interest Theory" of rights developed
in moral and political philosophy by Joseph Raz, Neil MacCormick, and
7. P. 52.
8. Coleman's answer to this question raises issues about corrective justice, which I discuss infra
Section II.
9. E.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974).
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others,'" and the one criticism of it that I want to make relates to its
divergence from the Interest Theory. To conclude this section, I briefly
outline Coleman and Kraus' theory and my criticism of it.
In traditional positivist jurisprudence, a legal right is strictly correlative
to a legal duty, and talk of legal rights is simply a way of talking about
legal duties from the point of view of those who stand to benefit from
their fulfillment. Rights and the duties imposed by legal rules are two
sides of the same coin. The "Interest Theory" of Raz and MacCormick
developed as a critique of that simple picture. MacCormick drew atten-
tion to cases in which it seemed possible to say determinately that a given
person had a certain right without it being possible to say who had the
correlative duty." And Raz insisted that we were often able to say confi-
dently that a given individual had a certain right without being confident
that we could specify a complete list of the duties that were owed to him
in that respect.' 2 It was better, he argued, to conceive of rights as the
grounds of duties rather than identify them as the duties themselves de-
scribed, as it were, in the passive voice.
On Raz's approach, rights are identified with the normative signifi-
cance of certain individual interests: To say that X has a right is to say
that "an aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty."' What the duty is,
who bears it, and how many duties may be generated on this basis, are all
left open by the identification of a given interest as the basis of a right.
Moreover, not all interests give rise to rights on this account: Some inter-
ests are important enough to provide reasons for imposing duties while
others are not.' 4 To say that X has a right to something is simply to
identify an interest that is sufficiently important in itself to be capable of
generating duties in this way. The virtue of this theory as an analytic
framework is that it leaves open, as substantive normative questions, how
the crucial interests are to be identified, whether they are invariably inter-
ests in liberty, what the duties are like, whether they are duties of re-
straint or assistance, whether they can be waived, and so on. Different
substantive theories can give different answers to these questions while
still sharing the analytic framework of the "Interest Theory" of rights.
Coleman and Kraus' approach is remarkably similar. They notice that
the duties and facilities imposed by legal rules come in all shapes, sizes
10. See J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 165-92 (1986); J. WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY 62-105 (1988); MacCormick, Rights in Legislation, in LAW, MORALITY, AND
SOCIETY 189-209 Q. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1982); Raz, Legal Rights, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1984).
11. MacCormick, supra note 10, at 200-04.
12. J. RAZ, supra note 10, at 170-71.
13. Id. at 166.
14. In his critique of the "Interest Theory," Samuel Stoljar fails to see this. See S. STOLJAR, AN
ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS 31-35 (1984).
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and combinations, and that, on the whole, there is no point in identifying
rights with any particular type of rule or duty or any particular transac-
tion structure. Instead, they argue, the primary task in setting up a system
of legal rights is to designate or mark out certain interests as worthy of
protection: "rights are best iinderstood as 'conceptual markers' or 'place
holders,' used to designate a subset of legitimate interests or liberties to be
accorded special protection by law.""' What that protection amounts to
and, in particular, what it involves in the way of empowerment to transact
exchanges or transfers, are likely to differ from right to right, making it
impossible to infer simply from the concept of a right that, for example, a
property rule must be involved.
So far, so good. The advantage of this approach is that it tries to settle
as few issues as possible at the level of conceptual analysis, leaving all or
most important controversies to be sorted out by substantive argument
within the modest analytic framework that is laid out. But Coleman and
Kraus also add a further element to his analysis which, I think, leads
them into difficulties.
Once an interest has been given the privileged status of a right, we can
ask (according to Coleman and Kraus) two questions about the legal rules
that surround it. We can ask first what the privileged status of the interest
consists in: Is the interest protected by a property rule, an inalienability
rule, a liability rule, or some combination of these? And once we have
answered that, we can ask how that protection is itself upheld and en-
forced: What remedies are available when the interest is invaded? How
are breaches of the first set of rules deterred? The first is a question about
the content of the particular right; the second is a question about its
enforcement.
It may seem that Coleman and Kraus need this distinction because of
what they want to say about the cases (such as our reckless driving exam-
ple) where liability in tort operates as a sanction, rather than as part of
the transaction structure. But even there they are ambiguous. Sometimes
they say that the transaction structure (and thus the content of the right)
is given by a combination of a property and a liability rule, along the lines
of (3') above. 6 Elsewhere they say that the liability rule in (3') is not part
of the content of the right, but is to be understood rather as "a layer of
potential 'enforcement' for entitlements whose conditions of transfer are
otherwise fully specified by a property rule.""7
I cannot see why the distinction is important. So long as it is understood
that consent in these cases is necessary for legitimate transfer, what does it






transfer is part of the right's content or part of the enforcement
mechanism?
Moreover, what are we to say about the cases where an interest is pro-
tected only by a liability rule? Are we to say that the liability rule is
necessarily the content of the right in that case (for lack of any other
candidate), or can we continue to say that it is simply a layer of enforce-
ment? Again, Coleman and Kraus' account leaves me with no idea how to
answer this question (and no idea why it is important).
For reasons that are unclear, they seem to believe it is possible for in-
terests to be protected by liability rules without attaining the status of
rights. Not every claim to damages arises from the infringement of a right,
they say."8 (They provide no example, but presumably have in mind cases
in which purely economic losses may be compensable in tort if they have
been caused through fraud or deceit.) But it is quite unclear what is lack-
ing in these cases, given Coleman and Kraus' commodious conception of
rights. An interest is marked out for legal protection, and the particular
form that protection takes happens to be a liability rule associated with
wrongful invasions of the interest. It is not very robust protection, and it
does not cover invasions of all sorts, but the attraction of Coleman and
Kraus' theory purports to be that the analysis of rights would beg no
questions about the particular form of the protection. Maybe it is custom-
ary, on some more restrictive conception, to say that rights are not in-
volved in these cases, because (for example) the interests are not protected
by property rules. But the beginning of the essay creates the impression
that Coleman and Kraus' intention includes challenging that restrictive
approach.
II. TORTS AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Why should people be compensated for some of the losses they suffer?
And why should that compensation be paid by the people who caused the
loss? As we have seen, Coleman rejects the explanation that in all cases
the payment of compensation is a way of legitimating ex post the imposi-
tion of the loss. He rejects the EAL story, in which liability rules promote
efficiency in the face of transaction costs, at least as an account of many
torts. But that leaves him with the task of providing an alternative account
of why damages are due an injured party, at least in those cases where
EAL is inadequate. In the chapter entitled "Corrective Justice and
Wrongful Gain," Coleman examines the extent to which an Aristotelian-
style principle of corrective justice can take up the slack here.
It is part of Coleman's general approach to jurisprudence that most
areas of law cannot adequately be understood in terms of the application
18. P. 46.
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of a single overarching principle. Certainly, he thinks the principle of eco-
nomic efficiency explains much less than adherents of EAL believe it does.
But he believes that many of the traditional alternatives to the principle of
efficiency, such as the principle of corrective justice, provide only partial
explanations as well.
If it turns out, as I think it does, that only certain well-defined areas
of tort law can be comprehended by a single principle, so much the
better for my view, for it demonstrates theoretically what we know
pretheoretically - namely, that the law of torts is extremely com-
plex and that it resists simple analysis.' 9
I am sure this is true: Everything we know about the way the law devel-
ops argues for its eclecticism. But it would be interesting to see Coleman
develop an account of that complexity in the general context of legal phi-
losophy. Ronald Dworkin has argued that interpreting the law involves
imposing a certain unity on a mass of materials that belies the diversity of
its origins.2" Since Coleman's approach suggests that there are limits on
our ability to do this, it would be interesting to see his response to Dwor-
kin's arguments. Unfortunately, we do not have that yet, at least not in
this volume. 2'
In the present chapter, Coleman argues that a principle of corrective
justice can at most explain why, in the case of some torts, a plaintiff has a
right to compensation. It cannot explain that in the case of all torts, such
as strict liability for ultrahazardous activities or defective products.22 And
even in the cases it covers (such as liability in negligence), it cannot ex-
plain why the person who caused the loss should be the one to pay the
compensation that is due to the victim.
Unfortunately, Coleman nowhere provides any sustained discussion of
corrective justice: What it is and what it involves. One difficulty with this
collection is that Coleman has had to pick and choose which of his many
publications should be included, and one or two which are, so to speak,
crucial to the issues under discussion have been omitted.23 That makes the
volume less useful as a general articulation of his views, more interesting
as a tantalizing "sampler" of what Coleman has to say.
In the usual account of corrective justice, we are to imagine an existing
distribution of goods or well-being that is regarded as just. An invasion of
one person's interests, the interests of A, by the actions of another person,
19. P. 189.
20. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-225 (1986).
21. There is a discussion of Dworkin's earlier arguments in the chapter entitled "Negative and
Positive Positivism," which I have no space to examine here, but the book contains no discussion at all
of Law's Empire.
22. P. 189.
23. For example, Coleman, On the Moral Argument for the Fault System, 71 J. PHIL. 473
(1974); Coleman, Justice and the Argument for No-Fault, 3 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 161 (1974).
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B, disrupts that order. Now A has less than he had under the just distri-
bution, and perhaps B has more. The solution seems to involve tampering
with the resulting holdings of both A and B: B's holding should be re-
duced by the amount of his wrongful gain and A's increased by the
amount of his wrongful loss. "The principle of corrective justice requires
the annulments of both wrongful gains and losses." 24
There are several things to notice about this principle. First, it presup-
poses some independent criterion for determining just and unjust distribu-
tions of resources. One criticism that is sometimes made is that corrective
justice provides no explanation at all for a tortfeasor's duty to compensate
his victim, if the latter already had more goods than he would have been
entitled to under an ideal distributive order. The answer may be that the
law endorses the existing (pre-tort) distribution as just, even if we (as
theorists of justice) do not, and that is all that is necessary to explain why
the law requires compensation as a way of restoring that distribution. If
we disagree with the initial endorsement, of course we will disagree that
restoring it counts as corrective justice; but that does not mean that correc-
tive justice fails to capture the claim that the law is making. Still there is
something to the objection. Many people think of torts as wrongs that
require redress whether they think the initial distribution was just or not.
("Never mind about just distributions. We can't have people going round
recklessly imposing losses on one another.") A theory of corrective justice
simply cannot capture the sense that the issues are independent in this
way.
A second point is one to which Coleman devotes most of his chapter. A
theory of corrective justice can explain why A's losses should be repaired
and B's gains annulled, but it cannot explain why B should be the one to
pay the compensation to A. There is no reason whatsoever to suppose that
B's wrongful gains are equal to A's wrongful losses. For one thing, it may
be hard to pin down any particular gain that a tortfeasor has secured.
Coleman notes quite rightly that a person who drives negligently secures
whatever gain he does (for example, by not shouldering the burden of
taking care) whether he injures anyone or not. He gains nothing extra if
he injures someone, but it is only in that case that he has to pay anything:
There is no wrongful gain specifically correlative to the defendant's
wrongful loss. "The wrongful gain negligent motorists secure is logically
distinct from any loss they may cause others, and so the occasion of an-
other's loss cannot be the moral basis for annulling these gains as a matter
of justice." 5
24. P. 185. The prototype of such accounts is Aristotle's discussion of rectificatory justice in 5
ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, 1131b-32b (D. Ross trans. 1954).
25. P. 187. As Coleman notes, the appropriate way to annul the wrongful gain that accrues to
ncgligent drivers is to impose a fine for careless driving. "In this way we can treat this category of
wrtngful gains similarly by not imposing any additional burden on those particular faulty injurers [ I
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Coleman's conclusion is that in these cases the theory of corrective jus-
tice plays only a limited role. It explains A's right to compensation, but it
does not explain who should bear the duty to compensate.26 If we impose
the duty on the tortfeasor B, it must be for independent reasons, such as
deterrence, administrative convenience, or retribution for wrongdoing. But
Coleman is on shaky ground here. Take retribution first. The same logic
that associates wrongful gain with all careless driving (whether it causes
loss to anyone or not) will also associate moral guilt with all careless driv-
ing, and so fail to explain any rule that imposes the particularly severe
penalty of having to compensate A on the particular driver who injured
him. Indeed, if the aim of retribution is to penalize people in proportion
to the wrongness of their conduct, there is no reason to suppose this bears
any relation to the amount of their victim's loss. A moment's carelessness
may cripple a person for life, while a malicious intention may, as it turns
out, occasion only a slight injury. Retribution explains why tortfeasors
should be penalized, but it does not explain (what we assume in tort) that
the victim's loss is the best guide to the appropriate scale of the penalty.
The other justifications run into even deeper trouble. Suppose that B
has secured only a slight wrongful gain from injuring A, but that we de-
cide for reasons of social policy (deterrence or accident cost avoidance) to
impose the full duty to repair A's loss on B. Then B must suffer a loss;
that is, B ends up with substantially less than he was entitled to under the
just distribution before the incident took place. Apart from his slight
wrongful gain, he is in as bad a position (relative to the just distribution)
after the payment of compensation as A was before the payment. So if A's
position cried out for repair on grounds of corrective justice why is the
same not true now of B's?
The response, I imagine, would be that B's loss was not "wrongful" in
the appropriate sense. But that will not do. The imposition of this loss on
B is not justified by his wrongful gain, and it may not be justified by any
principle of retribution. It is as wrongful as any other disruption of an
individual's entitlement under a just order for the sake of social conve-
nience. Since social convenience is seldom the principle underlying just
distributions, it is unlikely to justify what would otherwise be a wrongful
derogation from such a distribution.
Part of the problem is that Coleman gets tangled up in the notion of
wrongfulness and in the idea that it is only in the case of wrongful losses
that corrective justice demands repair. I agree that there will be some dis-
take it Coleman means 'drivers'] who, though they do not gain further by their mischief, are unfortu-
nate enough to cause another harm." Pp. 198-99.
26. On some accounts of rights-those tied tightly into a correlativity conception-that is incoher-
ent. For X to have a right is simply for there to be an identifiable Y who has some duty towards him.
But Coleman has adopted a more spacious conception of rights than that and, as I have already
explained in Section I, this part of his account is preferable to the correlativity model.
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tinction, in a theory of corrective justice, between losses that demand re-
pair and those that do not. But for the purposes of such a theory (particu-
larly as Coleman wants to deploy it), that distinction simply cannot be one
of wrongdoing or moral fault on the part of the person who causes the
loss. There is nothing in the idea of corrective justice that can possibly
link up with retributive considerations in this way. Particularly if one
takes Coleman's line that whether there is a repairable loss can be deter-
mined quite independently of who has the duty to repair, then the idea
that repairable losses are all and only those that result from culpable con-
duct seems quite unfounded.
There is a more sensible distinction between repairable and non-
repairable losses. Any sophisticated theory of distribution envisages the
possibility of individuals' holdings changing over time. Some people will
consume more of their chocolates than others, and they will come to have
less as a result. Some will invest part of their holding in a fair lottery, and
some of these investors will lose (while others will win). To enjoy such
gains and suffer such losses is the very reason that resources are distrib-
uted to people. It is part of an assignment of a holding to someone, and
the determination of how much should be assigned already takes this into
account. But not all distributive vicissitudes will be regarded in this way.
Some of the losses that people suffer (or some risks of loss) are not part
and parcel of what it is normally to enjoy a holding. These are the ones
that we regard as actually disrupting the distributive order (rather than
consummating it, so to speak). Different theories of justice will draw this
distinction in different ways,27 but most will put suffering a loss as a re-
sult of someone else's negligence into this category, along with suffering a
loss as a result of confiscation imposed for the sake of the greater good.
One advantage of this approach, by the way, is that it explains a class
of cases that Coleman cannot. If I break into your mountain cabin to
escape a blizzard, my action is probably not wrongful since it is justified
through necessity. But you are still owed compensation for the damage to
your cabin. The explanation is simply that you have suffered a loss rela-
tive to your just entitlement. Having windows broken by necessitous
strangers is not a normal incident of enjoying a holding; in this respect it
is unlike the wear and tear on the property occasioned by one's own use.
Corrective justice calls for restoration of the status quo after I break into
your cabin even though nobody has done anything wrong. Something sim-
ilar may be said about the compensability of losses in cases of strict liabil-
ity. (Of course, nothing here settles the issue of who should pay the com-
pensation in these cases, but Coleman does not think that that is settled by
corrective justice in any case.)
27. For a particularly clear example, see Dworkin, What is Equality?-Il. Equality of Resources,
10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 292-345 (1981) (distinction between brute luck and option luck).
1990] 1453
The Yale Law Journal
From all of this, it seems that Coleman's eclectic approach to tort law
will not work. A tort system involves compensation for certain losses, and
it involves imposition of the duty to compensate on those who cause the
losses. Coleman thinks that corrective justice can explain the first but not
the second of these elements, but he says that there is "nothing in my view
that is incompatible with establishing a tort system to annul wrongful
losses." 28 That is a mistake. If Coleman's theory of corrective justice ex-
plains why plaintiffs have a right to compensation, it also explains why
defendants should not be forced to bear the loss of paying that compensa-
tion. If it does not explain the latter, it cannot explain the former.
III. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
According to the proponents of EAL, the touchstone of legal decision-
making should be the promotion of efficiency in society. Of course this is
only one of the claims made by EAL. It is normative in character whereas
some EAL claims are descriptive as well, arguing that the promotion of
efficiency as a goal is the best way of characterizing legal decision-making,
and perhaps even the best way of predicting it. But it is the normative
claim I want to attend to.
In one of the most influential essays in this collection, "Efficiency, Util-
ity and Wealth Maximization," Coleman develops a critique of this claim.
He notes, first of all, that "efficiency" is often insufficiently defined, with
EAL theorists shifting among Pareto-superiority, Pareto-optimality,
Kaldor-Hicks superiority, and the maximization of wealth. His own pre-
cision in the definition of these concepts is, as I remarked at the beginning
of this review, one of the most attractive features of these essays. Only
when we have a clear idea of what these standards involve can we say
anything useful about their justification. Those who defend these effi-
ciency standards usually do so on one or both of two grounds: individual
liberty or social utility. Coleman has critical things to say about both lines
of defense.
The defense in terms of liberty seems clearest in cases where the pro-
motion of efficiency is understood in terms of the facilitation of Pareto-
improvements. It seems desirable to facilitate Pareto-improvements be-
cause the transactions that yield such improvements are characteristically
transactions that people will engage in voluntarily if they are left free to
deal with one another on their own terms. The argument appears persua-
sive, but in fact it faces a number of difficulties.
A first objection, according to Coleman, is that if we tie liberty and
Pareto-improvement together this tightly, we rule out by definition the
possibility of a person's acting freely to his own detriment.2" But in fact
28. P. 200.
29. Pp. 123-24.
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this point shows only that the Paretian standard does not provide an argu-
ment for transactional freedom. It does not in itself undermine the argu-
ment in the other direction, from transactional freedom to the desirability
of pursuing Pareto-improvements, and that is the one that is important
here.
The real difficulty with the libertarian defense shows up when we ask,
"In what sort of case is the facilitation of Pareto-improvements going to
be an issue?" There are two classes of cases to consider. If a Pareto-
improvement has or is about to take place as a result of the free interac-
tion of the parties concerned, then of course a principle of liberty provides
a good reason for not disturbing or impeding it, although it also provides a
good reason for not impeding a voluntary transaction which does not yield
a Pareto-improvement. But these are not the cases that concern EAL.
The cases with which EAL is concerned are those where a Pareto-
improvement is in principle available, but the parties have not secured the
gain because of imperfections like limited information or high transaction
costs. In these cases, according to EAL, the law should intervene to pro-
mote the Pareto-improvement because the parties are unable to secure it
for themselves. Coleman points out, devastatingly, that whatever the justi-
fication for this sort of intervention, it cannot be based on liberty.30 De-
fenders of liberty are interested only in how free people actually are. We
do not promote actual liberty in the real world by forcing through trans-
fers that the parties might have entered into freely in an ideal world. To
mimic coercively what a system of free transactions might have produced
under ideal conditions is merely to mention freedom, not to promote it.
Utilitarian justifications for intervention in these cases seem no better.
For one thing, the very idea of using utilitarianism to justify the pursuit of
efficiency (in a Paretian sense) is odd, since the former is much more
controversial than the latter. As Coleman points out, many philosophers
doubt whether the utilitarian standard can justify anything. Since the pur-
suit of aggregate utility characteristically involves the imposition of net
losses on certain parties, it seems itself much more in need of justification
than the Pareto standards, which never involve such trade-offs.
Having said that, however, I want to show that Coleman's particular
criticisms of the efficiency/utility connection are vitiated by a number of
errors.
Consider first the notion of a Pareto-improvement: A move is made
from one situation to another such that at least one person prefers the new
situation to the old one and no person prefers the old situation to the new.
Is such an improvement desirable from the point of view of classical utili-
tarianism? 31 The answer seems obvious: Since a Pareto-improvement in-
30. Pp. 124-25.
31. For simplicity, I shall concentrate on a version of utilitarianism which seeks to maximize the
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volves nothing but the enhancement of someone's preference-satisfaction, it
must amount to an increase in total utility.
Coleman argues that this answer is acceptable only if there exists a
standard for comparing the utilities of different individuals:
If the Pareto-superior standard is to be an index of total utility, in-
terpersonal utility comparisons are necessary, since the concept of
total utility presupposes the capacity to aggregate individual utility
functions, which in turn requires a standard of comparison. Provided
such a standard exists, Pareto improvements increase total utility;
and because they do, one could argue that the justification for pursu-
ing Pareto improvements relies on its connection to utilitarianism."2
His argument seems to be that since the existence of a standard of inter-
personal comparisons is a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of
the concept of aggregate utility, any doubts about the existence of such a
standard will undermine the claim that the pursuit of aggregate utility
justifies the pursuit of Pareto-improvements. I think Coleman's argument
is misleading, but the difficulty needs to be stated carefully.
The first thing to note is that the problem concerns cardinal utilities.33
Suppose we can establish that I value wine twice as much as I value beer,
and that you value wine three times as much as you value beer: the prob-
lem, for a utilitarian, is to find a way of expressing the value that I attach
to wine or beer in terms of the value you attach to either of these bever-
ages. Unless he can do that, the utilitarian will be unable to say whether
transferring a given bottle of wine from me to you raises or lowers aggre-
gate utility.
Those who impugn the interpersonal comparison that this calculation
requires may be raising either an ontological or an epistemic issue. The
ontological issue is whether there really exists a basis for expressing the
utilities of wine and beer for me in terms of the utilities of wine and beer
for you. We can of course choose any one of an infinite number of compa-
rability conventions, but the ontological difficulty concerns the existence of
total amount of utility rather than the average. (For arguments that show that the latter is in fact
more attractive, see J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 161-66 (1971).) Coleman misleadingly sug-
gests that the choice between these alternatives involves matters of distribution. P. 96. That is false:
Average utilitarianism involves no greater concern with distribution than total utilitarianism does. If
"average" meant "median" or "mode," then some minimal information about distribution could be
inferred from knowledge about average utility. But in the ethical literature, "average utility" is always
understood as "mean utility"-that is, the total utility divided by the number of persons whose utility
is in question.
32. Pp. 100-01.
33. It is possible to define a notion of aggregate ordinal utility which does not require interper-
sonal comparisons. But the usefulness of such a concept is limited, and it can do hardly any of the
work that the traditional utilitarian principle is supposed to do. Utilitarians base their judgments on
cardinal aggregate utility, which requires interpersonal comparisons. In what follows, "aggregate
utility" should always be taken to mean "aggregate cardinal utility." I am grateful to Jody Kraus for
bringing this point to my attention.
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a non-arbitrary basis for such a choice. An ontological skeptic may say
there is no truth of the matter, in regard to the claim that wine affords
you greater satisfaction than it affords me, or in regard to the claim that
one person's pain or pleasure is more intense than another's.
Even if we are not persuaded by the ontological difficulty, there may
still be a problem of knowledge and application. How can we be sure that
we have chosen the right convention of comparability? And how is such a
standard to be applied in practice?
Let us take the ontological difficulty first. Suppose there exists no basis
in reality for comparing the utilities of two people. Does that mean that
the phrase "aggregate utility" is meaningless? The answer is obviously
"No." After all, we had to appeal to its meaning in order to discover that
it presupposed the existence of a standard for interpersonal comparisons.
A piece of gibberish would not even tell us that much. Now, the meaning
of the phrase can tell us other things as well, things that are quite inde-
pendent of what it tells us about the need for a standard of interpersonal
comparisons. For example, the word "aggregate" has certain implications.
The idea of aggregating or summing several quantities logically implies
that if one of these quantities goes up while none of the others goes down,
then the aggregate or sum must go up. This is true whether we are talk-
ing about utility, money or weight. Applied to utility, this reasoning es-
tablishes that if one person is made better off by a policy which makes no
person worse off, then aggregate utility must increase. But this is exactly
the connection between utilitarianism and Pareto-superiority that Cole-
man called in question. It is an implication of the idea of aggregate utility
that is quite independent of the issue about interpersonal comparisons of
utility. It follows from the logic of "aggregation" not from anything spe-
cial about its aplication to utility.
Of course, if we find that there is no standard of interpersonal compa-
rability, then establishing this connection between utility and Pareto-
superiority will have been to no avail. But even in advance of knowing
how the ontological issue will turn out, we can say this: If there is any-
thing to the notion of aggregate utility at all, then a Pareto-improvement
is always an increase in aggregate utility.
The point becomes even stronger if our difficulty with interpersonal
comparisons is only epistemic. For then we can say categorically that a
Pareto-improvement is always an increase in aggregate utility. Since
Pareto-improvements can be identified whether we can reliably discern
and measure differences in the utilities of different people or not, our epi-
stemic doubts about interpersonal comparisons need not affect the link be-
tween the Pareto-judgments and utilitarian judgments. The epistemic dif-
ficulties will afflict only those cases in which claims are being made about
changes in aggregate utility that do not involve Pareto-improvements. So
whether our doubts about interpersonal comparisons are ontological or
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merely epistemic, they do not impugn the conceptual connection between
Pareto-improvements and aggregate utility.
Utilitarians define right action in terms of aggregate utility. But it is
important to remember that not just any increase in aggregate utility
counts for them as the right thing to do. And here Coleman's criticism is
nearer the mark. Although any Pareto-improvement involves an increase
in aggregate utility, not every increase in aggregate utility is a Pareto-
improvement. Sometimes utility overall may be increased by a policy
which actually frustrates the preferences of some people. If interpersonal
comparisons are available to make sense of that, they may also enable us
to say that a given Pareto-improvement increases utility by less than a
policy which is not a Pareto-improvement. Circumstances can be imagined
in which the latter policy is an opportunity cost of the former: We have a
choice between making a Pareto-improvement and increasing utility by
more through a policy which involves losers. In such a case, utilitarians
would recommend the latter choice, and condemn the Pareto-improvement
as wrong. Of course, if we are unable to make interpersonal comparisons,
we will not be in a position to know which non-Pareto-improving policies
are superior to a given Pareto-improvement. But lack of such knowledge
does not amount to utilitarian endorsement of the Pareto-improvement
faute de mieux. What it means is that the utilitarian, by his own lights, is
unable to say whether the Pareto-improvement is the best policy or not.
What about Pareto-optimality? How does that stand to aggregate util-
ity? Many allocations of resources are Pareto-optimal in the sense that no
Pareto-improvement is possible from them. Since there is no reason to
believe that every Pareto-optimal allocation contains the same amount of
aggregate utility, there is no basis whatever for identifying "Pareto-
optimal" with "greatest aggregate utility." Once again, of course, we may
not be able to tell that one Pareto-optimal allocation contains more aggre-
gate utility than another. What we can say is that, if (counterfactually) we
could make interpersonal comparisons of utility, we would not expect all
Pareto-optimal allocations to contain the same amount, and that is suffi-
cient to refute the alleged connection between Pareto-optimally and utili-
tarianism. So far, so good.
Unfortunately, Coleman goes on to obscure this point in two ways. He
says that we can make no judgments about the relative utility content of
the various members of the set of Pareto-optimal distributions "because
the set of Pareto-optimal distributions cannot be compared by the Pareto-
superiority standard."34 The reason given is correct, but it is quite irrele-
vant. The Pareto-superiority of one state to another is a sufficient but not
a necessary condition for the former having more aggregate utility than
the latter. In principle, then, there can be distinctions of aggregate utility
34. P. 103.
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between allocations, whether some of those allocations are Pareto-superior
to others or not. (But, as always, it may be impossible for us to make
judgements about these distinctions.)
Coleman also says, misleadingly, that "whether Pareto optimality is
rooted in utilitarianism will depend on whether Pareto-superiority is.""5
Again that confuses a sufficient with a necessary condition. Pareto-
superiority's being "rooted in utilitarianism" can only mean that a
Pareto-improvement is a sufficient condition for a utilitarian improve-
ment. Suppose that relation holds. Still, nothing follows about Pareto-
optimality. There may be utilitarian improvements from a Pareto-optimal
position, despite the fact that there can be no Pareto-improvements. And
the move to a Pareto-optimal position may increase aggregate utility,
whether the move involves a Pareto-improvement or not. The only thing
we can say about the relation between Pareto-optimality and aggregate
utility is that, for any given Pareto-optimal state S there are other states
containing less utility-those states that are Pareto-inferior to it. This is a
very weak relation indeed.
The notion of Kaldor-Hicks superiority (KH-superiority) is not identi-
cal to either of the Pareto-standards, and it is often thought to have a
much stronger relation to the standard of aggregate utility than they do.
One allocation is KH-superior to another if those who gain in a move
from the latter to the former gain enough so that they could compensate
those who lose and still have some increase in utility left over. It looks as
though KH-superiority is necessary as well as sufficient for an increase in
aggregate utility. If some persons' utility goes down while aggregate util-
ity is increased, then some other persons' utility must have gone up.
Moreover, it must have gone up by more than the amount the others'
utility went down, or else there can have been no increase in the total.
That point can be represented in terms of a sum of increments in utility:
The winners must enjoy both an increment in utility which, if transferred
to the losers, would exactly compensate them for their loss, as well as
some additional increment in utility over and above this amount. That
looks exactly like the KH standard. It is natural to think that KH-
superiority is a necessary and sufficient condition for a utilitarian
improvement.
Coleman questions whether a KH-improvement is sufficient for an in-
crease in aggregate utility. He adduces something called the Scitovsky par-
adox, which shows that there may be two allocations, Al and A2, each of
which is KH-superior to the other.3 6 But Al cannot contain more utility
than A2 while A2 contains more utility than Al. So KH-superiority can-
35, P. 103.
36. The paradox is named for its discussion in an article by Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Pro-
positions in Economics, 9 REv. OF ECON. STUD. 77, 88 (1941).
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not be a sufficient condition for a situation's containing more utility. Cole-
man makes a great deal of this point, emphasizing several times that it
simply destroys the link between Kaldor-Hicks and the principle of util-
ity. But it does not. He notes himself that the Scitovsky paradox can be
avoided by defining a slightly stronger version of KH (which I call KH*):
Al is KH*-superior to A2 if Al is KH-superior to A2, and if A2 is not
KH-superior to Al. "This," says Coleman, "eliminates the paradox, but
then Kaldor-Hicks will not be transitive. '37 This is quite misleading:
KH-superiority is not transitive, but KH *-superiority, as defined, is tran-
sitive. And KH*-superiority is both necessary and sufficient for an in-
crease in aggregate utility.
Notice two general points about this relation between KH*-superiority
and aggregate utility. First, as always, it presupposes interpersonal com-
parisons of utility. And second, it does not imply that in any situation a
given KH*-improvement is, from a utilitarian point of view, the right
thing to do. We have already seen that the concept of an increase in ag-
gregate utility and the right thing to do for a utilitarian are not the same.
The right thing to do will always be a KH-improvement, but right action
for the utilitarian involves selecting which increase in aggregate utility
(and therefore which KH-improvement) yields the greatest total.
That second point is important because it illustrates that nothing in all
of this provides a utilitarian defense of either the Pareto or the KH* stan-
dard. The link between Pareto superiority and an increase in utility does
not amount to a utilitarian defense of the former because utilitarians are
distinguished not by their demand for just any increase in utility but by
their demand for the greatest increase in aggregate utility available. And
the same is true for KH*. So even if utilitarianism is the best justificatory
theory available (which, as Coleman notes, many doubt), and even if eve-
rything I have said is true, nothing has been shown to justify the use of
either Pareto-superiority or KH*-superiority as the principle to be ap-
plied in the courtroom.
Notice also that, even if they were successful, neither of these defenses
(the one based on liberty or the one based on utility) would show that the
pursuit of efficiency should be the sole concern of the law. Very few peo-
ple deny that efficiency (especially in a Pareto sense) is a good thing.
What they deny is that this is the only criteria by which economic
processes and outcomes are to be assessed. In particular, they insist that
considerations of equality, distributive justice, desert, and need should
play a part in the assignment of rights. What is unpalatable about EAL is
not its concern with efficiency, but its obsession with it to the exclusion of
everything else.
37. P. 104 (footnote omitted).
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IV. PRE-MARKET CONTRACTS
There cannot be a market unless there are property rights, and to the
extent that economics studies markets, the discipline presupposes at least a
set of initial entitlements of persons over things. People bring something to
the marketplace looking to exchange it for what others bring. The idea
that such exchanges are Pareto-improvements and the idea of market effi-
ciency that is built on that assume that no one must trade unless she
wants to. So what one brings to the market must be not merely holdings,
but holdings over which one has rights.
It is often assumed that economics has nothing to say about the initial
distribution of these rights. Initial distribution is a matter of power, or it
is a matter of equity and justice, but it is not a subject on which econo-
mists have anything distinctive to say. Of course it is important. The dis-
tributive features of a market equilibrium (who ends up with what) are
profoundly affected by the initial distribution (who begins with what).
Since any number of resource allocations, both equal and unequal, can be
efficient, efficiency as such-which economists do understand-confers no
distributive legitimacy whatever on either the outcome or the starting
point of market interaction. If there are objections to the starting point,
there will be objections to the finishing point, and nothing about equilib-
rium or efficiency answers those objections. The point is not that an objec-
tionable set of initial endowments calls in question the freedom or ration-
ality of subsequent transactions (though that may also be true). It is
simply a matter of legitimacy in, legitimacy out."
Though economists, qua theorists of the market, have nothing to say
about the determination of initial holdings, there is no reason to think that
the more general theory of rational choice should be silent on the issue.
Coleman is aware of this and devotes an interesting section of his essay
"Market Contractarianism" to a discussion of the emergence of a set of
property rights in terms of rational choice.
Historically, the pioneer of the rational choice approach to the emer-
gence of property rights is David Hume, and its most distinguished recent
38. The point is most clearly stated in D. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 94-95 (1986):
The operation of the market is to convert an initial situation specified in terms of individual
factor endowments into a final outcome specified in terms of a distribution of goods or products
among the same individuals. Since the market outcome is both in equilibrium and optimal, its
operation is shown to be rational, and since it proceeds through the free activity of individuals,
we claim that its rationality leaves no place for moral assessment. Given the initial situation of
the market, its outcome cannot but be fully justified. But neither the operation of the market
nor its outcome can show, or even tend to show, that its initial situation is also either rational
or morally acceptable .... Market outcomes are fair if, but of course only if, they result from
fair initial condit i .s.
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exponent is the Nobel laureate James Buchanan.3 The particular version
of that approach that Coleman discusses40 proceeds as follows.
Postulate a set of individuals in an environment where there are mate-
rial resources they can use. The individuals will grab whatever resources
they can, and these will be their holdings. There is nothing legitimate
about these possessions; they amount simply to what the individuals can
retain. Moreover, they will seize part of the holdings of others whenever
they can and try to retain those, too. Indeed, each person will devote a
considerable amount of time and energy to attacking the holdings of others
and defending his own against others' depredations. In time, it will occur
to these people that everyone might be better off by cooperating with
others in the protection of holdings. For example, if there are economies
of scale in the provision of protection, an individual contributing to a co-
operative protection scheme might end up paying less than he would in
protecting his holding himself. Suppose this is true of each individual, no
matter what the size of his holding: Protection can be provided to him at a
unit cost that is less than the cost to him of providing it himself. Then it is
in the interest of each individual to cooperate in such a scheme. Setting up
such a scheme involves establishing institutions of specialist enforcement
(in effect, a state or a legal system), and it involves the recognition by
those institutions of each person's holding as something to be protected.
Since protection will be afforded by the central enforcement of rules
prohibiting invasion or takings without consent, such a scheme amounts to
a regime of property rights. The holdings that the individuals have a rea-
son to protect in this way are now regarded as rightful, just in the sense
that they are protected by the enforcement of such rules. With this scheme
in place to prevent depredation, a market, involving now the strictly vol-
untary transfer of holdings, can get underway.
That, in brief, is the story Coleman wants to consider. It is not a story
that he accepts; his technique as usual is to set it out, with considerable
technical clarity, and then attack it, largely on technical grounds, showing
that the claims that are made for it are more shaky than they might
appear.
As it stands, the story certainly seems to have its difficulties. For one
thing, there is likely to be a free-rider problem with regard to the provi-
sion of protection. If it is costly or difficult to exclude those who do not
pay for the protection agency from the benefits of its operation, people
might be tempted to enjoy its benefits without contributing to its costs. We
cannot say simply that the protection agency can use its coercive power to
exact contributions as taxes, for if the temptation to free-ride is wide-
39. D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 484-567 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed. 1888); J.
BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY (1975). It is surprising to find no reference whatever to Hume
in Coleman's discussion of this theory.
40. Pp. 262-65.
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spread, it threatens the very possibility of constituting these coercive mech-
anisms in the first place.41 We can call this Hobbes' problem: The prison-
ers' dilemma of the state of nature cannot be solved by the setting up of
leviathan, since the setting up of leviathan itself involves the solution of
what appears to be a similar collective action problem."'
That is one difficulty. Another, and the one to which Coleman devotes
most attention, is the bargaining problem involved in the realization of the
gains that accrue from setting up cooperative protection. Though everyone
in possession of a holding stands to gain, how much each gains will be a
matter of negotiation. Since the initial holdings are not given as equal,
and since individuals are not equally capable of defending whatever hold-
ings they have, their threat advantages (the utility to each of the coopera-
tive scheme's foundering, that is, of his having to fall back on his own
defensive resources) are not the same. Some parties may hold out for a
better deal, and this holding-out has costs for all. Coleman argues that we
cannot simply assume that because cooperative protection is more efficient
in itself than individual protection, it therefore retains this edge of effi-
ciency once the costs of bargaining behavior are taken into account.43
The general point that he stresses here is well-taken: Since every Pareto
improvement involves a potential surplus, and since the improvement will
not be made unless the parties can reach a bargain concerning the division
of the surplus, and since bargaining is itself not cost-free, we cannot infer
that every Pareto-improvement that is in principle available will be se-
cured in fact.
This in turn yields a more general critique of welfare economics. Econ-
omists often argue that since efficiency and distribution are conceptually
distinguishable, the institutional mechanisms for promoting efficiency can
be, and ought to be, quite distinct from the institutional mechanisms con-
cerned with the distribution and redistribution of wealth. But Coleman's
emphasis on the bargaining problem indicates that there are often distri-
butional questions to be settled in the course of our pursuit of efficiency.
41. P. 266.
42. In fact, as Jean Hampton has shown, the collective action problem involved in the constitution
of a Hobbesian sovereign is not a prisoners' dilemma, and hence not identical to the problem its
institution is supposed to solve. J. HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION
132-88 (1986).
43. P. 274. But Coleman neglects one special feature of the situation we are discussing. The cost
to individuals of protecting their holdings, and the advantages that joint protection would offer, are, as
it were, endemic. Holdings must be protected indefinitely, and it will always be the case, even if a
particular bargain fails, that cooperative protection, minute by minute, is cheaper. That is, we are not
dealing with a one-off situation, in which a potential gain from trade may evaporate if a bargain is
not reached. It is a feature of David Hume's account of this process that the "convention . . . to
bestow stability" on possessions "arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression." D.
HuME, supra note 39, at 490. (As we shall see, this is one of several respects in which Hume's
version of the rational choice story is more sophisticated and more interesting than the version Cole-
man considers.) No matter how many times we fail to reach agreement through holdouts, there is still
a gain to be realized from returning the next day to the bargaining table, since every day our holdings
must be protected.
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In cases where prices are not set by a perfectly competitive market, the
parties must bargain for the division of gains from trade or else they will
not secure them.
One response to this may be to say that although bargaining for the
division of gains from trade involves a distributive issue, it does not in-
volve the main issue of the distribution of wealth. The wealth that the
parties bring to the bargaining table, and therefore the area on the Pareto-
frontier where their bargain may be struck, are determined independently
of what they agree to in their bargaining. That may be true in some cases,
although it seems unlikely that what the parties think about the division
of the surplus will be utterly unrelated to what they think about distribu-
tion generally." It is in a relevant way untrue of the bargaining situation
we are discussing at present. Since the bargain to be struck is precisely an
agreement to recognize holdings of wealth, disagreements about the divi-
sion of the surplus are always liable to spill over into disagreements about
the distribution of the holdings to be recognized.
One effect of the bargaining problem is that even though everyone
gains, the bargain is likely to leave some in a situation where they gain
less than they might. As Coleman puts it, "whatever agreement is
reached, those who feel they are exploited will seek to destabilize the
agreement, and there is ample opportunity for them to do so."145 They will
try constantly to force renegotiation to redistribute the cooperative surplus.
We may interpret this possibility as simply part of the long-term bargain-
ing process involved in the emergence over time of a single Humean con-
vention. After all, the rational choice story is understood as a model of
what happens, not a blow-by-blow account.4 But we should see also that
there is no guarantee that a Humean convention will secure for all time
the stability of the pattern of holdings it recognizes. If over time the oper-
ation of the convention changes the balance of power, then we expect that
to result in a challenge to the terms of the convention. I shall return to
this below.
As if this were not bad enough, Coleman argues that the agreement
problem in the state of nature will be aggravated by certain features of the
property rights scheme. The institution that is to provide the cooperative
44. This is complicated by the fact that there is still no consensus among rational choice theorists
as to whether there is a unique solution to the bargaining game. See pp. 272-76; see also pp. 311-42
(reviewing argument on the issue in D. GAUTHIER, supra note 38).
45. P. 274.
46. As Coleman recognizes:
[Elven if rational choice theory cannot provide an account of the actual emergence of political
institutions, it might nevertheless provide an account of the contingent rationality of political
association (that is, a theory about why the move from anarchy to polity is rational) and an
account of the specific conditions or principles of rational political association (that is, a speci-
fication of the outcome of the rational bargain that takes place in order to overcome pre-market
market failure).
P. 267.
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protection will necessarily be a monopoly.47 It is therefore in a position to
collect an amount of revenue greater than that minimally needed to pro-
vide the necessary protection, generating a surplus shared effectively as
rent among the providers. This aspect of monopoly taxation and rent-
seeking may seriously distort the payoffi associated with the original po-
tential for Pareto-improvement, and it will certainly further distort the
bargaining process.4"
I am sure Coleman is right about all this, but it is worth noting how
the argument depends on features of his version of the rational choice
story which are quite different from the versions of Hume and Buchanan.
In Coleman's story, the potential for Pareto-improvement consists sim-
ply in economies of scale and specialization so far as the protection of
holdings is concerned. What changes, when the system of property rights
is set up, is that people no longer have to defend their holdings them-
selves. Coleman does not say that the agreement involves any mutual re-
nunciation of depredation: He seems to suggest that the threat to holdings
remains constant and that it is only the mode of defense that is altered.49
In contrast, the convention in David Hume's version of the story is
nothing but a convention of mutual restraint:
I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the pos-
session of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with
regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his
conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express'd,
and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and beha-
viour. . . .[Slince the actions of each of us have a reference to those
of the other, and are perform'd upon the supposition, that something
is to be perform'd on the other part.50
Property rights, for Hume, do not arise out of the institution of protection
or enforcement mechanisms. They arise out of "this convention, concern-
ing abstinence from the possessions of others." 51 The parties recognize
that they gain more by not attacking one another's holdings, and by not
having to defend their own against such attack, than they do from contin-
uing to pursue the temptations and the risks of predation. (The same is
true of Buchanan's version: The parties agree to accept the respective
holdings that they have already secured and to refrain from attacking the
47. For discussion of the emergence of a monopoly protection agency and its transformation into a
Weberian state (an organization that insists on having a monopoly over rights enforcement), see R.
NOZxCK, supra note 9, at 54-146.
48. Pp. 268-71.
49. This is a little unclear. His technical account of the arithmetic of the Pareto-improvement
suggests that the savings in the shift from individual to cooperative protection include saving the costs
tu oneself of attacking others' holdings. Pp. 264-65.
50. D. HUME, supra note 39, at 490.
51. Id.
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holdings of others.) Although it does not set up a state or an institution-
alized legal system, the Humean convention still generates rules and a
sense of obligation. But those notions are understood primarily in terms of
the "internal aspect" that grows out of a shared understanding of the
agreement, rather than in terms of the external enforcement which char-
acterizes Coleman's version of the story.52
This makes a difference to Coleman's characterization of the agreement
problem. First, if the agreement is one of mutual restraint, it is not at all
clear that there is serious bargaining to be done before the gains to the
parties can be realized. If each party refrains from attacking the holdings
of others, then each gains (more or less automatically) an amount equal to
the previous cost to himself of attacking others' holdings plus the previous
cost to himself of defending against others' attacks plus the cost of the
losses he would incur if his defenses failed (times, of course, the
probability of their failing). And each loses an amount equal to the
amount by which he could augment his holding by attacking others' (dis-
counted, this time, by the probability of their defenses failing). The
Humean assumption is that the sum of these gains and losses is positive in
the case of each person. But my present point is that these gains and losses
accrue to the parties as a direct consequence of mutual restraint. Their
accrual does not depend on bargaining. That X and Y agree to mutual
restraint is all that is necessary for X to achieve this gain: His gain results
directly from his not attacking Y and from his not being attacked by him.
Second, if the initial agreement, securing the Pareto-improvement, is
simply mutual restraint, the questions of monopoly pricing and rent-
seeking do not arise (at least, not immediately). Since the agreement insti-
tutes only a shared normative order, the provision of the public good of
mutual security does not require any specialized class or coalition of
providers.
Coleman might respond by saying that the Humean convention is
bound to be hopelessly fragile in the absence of an enforcement mecha-
nism. People will always have a temptation to violate the rights that they
have recognized. There are three points to make in response to this.
(1) Though the model indicates a single act of agreement, the Humean
version assumes that in reality the agreement will stabilize over a long
period of time:
Nor is the rule concerning the stability of possession the less deriv'd
from human conventions, that it arises gradually, and acquires force
by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the incon-
veniences of transgressing it.53
52. For the internal aspect of rules, see H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
53. D. HUME, supra note 39, at 490.
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Hume, like Hobbes, assumes that the prisoners' dilemma of cooperation
in the state of nature is iterated and that cooperative strategies may be
rational in the long-term even though violation is immediately tempting.5
(2) James Buchanan associates this dynamic aspect of the situation with
another. A Pareto-improvement is to be expected from a Humean agree-
ment only as the parties discover the limits of their respective predatory
capacities. Since time immemorial people will have been seizing, using
and fighting over resources:
In any case, as a result of the actual or potential conflict over the
relative proportions of [resources] to be finally consumed, some "nat-
ural distribution" will come to be established. This cannot properly
be classified as a structure of rights, since no formal agreement is
made, although there might well exist mutual recognition of the ap-
propriate bounds on individual action. Nonetheless, the natural dis-
tribution may represent a conceptual equilibrium, in which each
person extends his own behavior in securing (defending) shares in
[resources] to the limit where marginal benefits from further effort
are equal to the marginal costs that such effort requires.55
Such a distribution might be equal or unequal, but the parties will al-
ready know that they cannot hope for a much better distribution by pitch-
ing their own strength yet again against that of others.
(3) Hume acknowledges that there is a role for a government in provid-
ing each with an assurance that others will take a long-term view of the
advantages of iterated cooperation and not succumb to "their violent
propension to prefer contiguous to remote" advantages.56 People will
agree to set up and obey a government that will enforce the terms of the
original agreement, and thus "acquire a security against each others
weakness and passion, as well as against their own."' 57 But the point is
that the institution of a coercive power is understood quite independently
of the agreement on the bounds of property. Coleman's claims about the
monopoly character of such a power remain valid, of course; but they are
now theoretically distinguishable from whatever bargaining problem is in-
volved in the agreement to recognize property.
It is time to take stock. The rational-choice story, whether in Coleman's
version or in Hume's, imagines the institution of a system of property
rights based on and recognizing the holdings that people happen to have
acquired through processes (such as occupancy and depredation) that are
quite independent of agreement. Suppose the difficulties Coleman identi-
fies can be overcome. What does this show?
54. T. HOBBEs, LEVIATHAN 201-06 (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1982).
55. J. BUCHANAN, supra note 39, at 24.
56. D. HUME, supra note 39, at 537.
57. Id. at 538.
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It shows that a complete account of the institution and operation of a
market economy can be given in rational choice terms. Apart from the
story we have been considering, economists had simply to assume a set of
individuals endowed with initial entitlements; their account of markets
was predicated on that assumption. Now we have an account of the exis-
tence of such entitlements, an account that uses the same terms (the terms
of rational choice theory) that are used in characterizing the market itself.
It is therefore important for the completeness of rational choice theory in
this area that the story be closely scrutinized, and that is the merit of
Coleman's discussion.
However, what the story, even if true and rigorous, does not show is
that economists can give an account of distributive justice. They can give a
rational choice account of a distribution, and they can give a rational
choice account of how a distribution determined by seizure and predation
might be accepted by everyone and form the basis for a system of property
rights and a market economy. But none of this answers any question
about the moral legitimacy of holdings, whether at the beginning of time
or at any particular moment in the continuing operation of the market.
The point should be obvious enough. The possessions ratified by a
Humean convention, or the natural equilibrium in Buchanan's version of
the story, may involve the most radical inequality. There is nothing par-
ticularly creditable about the procedures by which holdings are acquired;
nothing particularly attractive about the personal features (strength, cun-
ning, ruthlessness, and luck) on which the outcome is likely to be pat-
terned; nothing, in short, that is likely to contribute to the legitimacy of
holdings. Humean possession is not equivalent to a principle of First Oc-
cupancy (for a present holder may have violently dispossessed another just
before the convention came into existence), and it is certainly not a Labor
principle of acquisition along Lockean or Nozickian lines.s Indeed, for all
that we can say, some individuals may reach Buchanan's natural equilib-
rium or come to the Humean convention possessed of the bodies or per-
sons of other individuals. Since there is nothing, on this account, morally
to be said about the basis of these possessions, there is nothing to rule out
slavery or cannibalism as features of the property system that is ratified in
this way.
If Hume is right, no question of justice or legitimacy can be raised until
there is agreement on some system of property rights along the lines we
have been considering. This is because the very concept of justice is de-
58. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 22-25 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3d
ed. 1698); R. NoziCK, supra note 9, at 150-82. There is an important distinction between those
libertarian theorists who follow Locke and Nozick and those who follow Hume and Buchanan in this
regard.
1468 [Vol. 99: 1441
1990] Criticizing Economic Analysis 1469
rived from the fact of this agreement.5" But nothing in his story shows
that questions of justice cannot subsequently outstrip the terms of the
original agreement or call them into question. For example, once the
Humean convention is established, people will agree to abide by principles
that, among other things, regulate the* (post-convention) acquisition of
new holdings. Hume suggests that a principle like First Occupancy will
fill this role. ° But if people will come to judge post-convention acquisi-
tions by this standard, they may be tempted in time to apply it also to
what they know about the origin of pre-convention holdings. Even though
they could not have had such a critical standard to apply to any acquisi-
tion unless pre-convention holdings had been recognized, still, once the
process of deploying standards has gotten underway, there is nothing con-
tradictory about turning those standards on the pre-convention holdings
themselves and calling the whole basis of subsequent transactions into
question. Particularly when we recall Coleman's emphasis on the ways in
which the new institutions for protecting property may alter, over time,
the balance of power among the property holders, there is nothing in the
Humean story to insulate the pattern of existing holdings, either descrip-
tively or normatively, from further challenge. Even if the enforcement in-
stitutions have been programmed to enforce only the regime of holdings
recognized at the time they were set up, we know enough about how such
institutions operate to recognize the possibility that they may be revised or
reprogrammed if there is a sufficient shift in the balance of social power.
The institutional entrenchment of a given set of property rights is as resil-
ient and as fragile as the structure of power that sustains the institutions
in question.
Thus, showing (as Hume does) that recognition of existing holdings is a
precondition for the deployment of any principle of justice is not, in itself,
a way of showing that the recognized holdings and the market outcomes
that flow from them cannot be scrutinized by a principle of justice, and it
is certainly not a way of showing that they are inalterable in the light of
such scrutiny.
I found it surprising that Coleman did not make more of this point
about justice in his critique of the rational choice story, particularly given
59. Hume writes:
After this convention, concerning abstinence from the possessions of others, is enter'd into, and
every one has acquir'd a stability in his possessions, there immediately arise the ideas of justice
and injustice; as also those of property, right, and obligation. The latter are altogether unintel-
ligible without first understanding the former. Our property is nothing but those goods, whose
constant possession is establish'd by the laws of society; that is by the laws of justice. . . .A
man's property is some object related to him. This relation is not natural, but moral, and
founded on justice. 'Tis very preposterous, therefore, to imagine, that we can have any idea of
property, without fulling comprehending the nature of justice, and shewing its origin in the
artifice and contrivance of men.
D. HUME, supra note 39, at 490-91.
60. Id. at 505-13.
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the role that distributive justice plays elsewhere in his work."1 He does
suggest at one point that the convention establishing property rules is
likely to be unstable if it is not perceived as fair: "[T]hose who are rela-
tively disadvantaged by the agreement will seek to destabilize it .... .""
But it is not clear whether this sense of relative disadvantage refers to the
distribution of holdings or merely to the distribution of the surplus se-
cured by the agreement itself.6" In another essay later in the book, Cole-
man notes that a process of the sort discussed here "may freeze, or at least
entrench, what is in fact a very unjust distribution of preconstitutional
holdings." '64 But again he obscures the point by continuing:
The initial assignment of rights is itself the outcome of rational bar-
gaining. It will not follow, however, . . that the allocation of prop-
erty rights, and of the gains from trade made possible by them, is
morally unassailable. That is because the allocation is the outcome of
rational bargaining, and the rational distribution of resources that
results from a bargain need not be a moral one.65
He adds in a footnote that "[t]his is just the question of whether rational
bargaining also provides a theory of 'moral bargaining.' "66 But it is not
just that: Even if the bargained distribution of the surplus is as moral as
can be, the assignment of rights that results is still mainly determined by
the respective holdings that the parties brought to the bargaining table.
And there is nothing at all moral about that.
I have belabored this point and this discussion, not because I believe
Coleman disagrees, but because there is always a temptation to think that
a rational choice theory, with its emphasis on agreement, unanimity, and
Pareto-improvement, and on the values of freedom and efficiency, necessa-
rily legitimizes whatever it explains. Nobody is forced into a Humean
convention, and everyone who is a party to it benefits, so who can com-
plain? The fallacy is simple: To improve the plight of those who suffer in
an unjust situation (or simply to gain their consent to such an improve-
ment) is not to make the resulting situation a just one or even necessarily
to mitigate the injustice. Everyone will agree to an improvement, and no-
body will complain about the improvement (considered in itself). But ev-
eryone can agree without undermining his insistence that both the pre-
61. One example is in his application of the principle of corrective justice to tort. See supra text
accompanying notes 19-28. There is no argument based on justice for protecting a Humean allocation
from disruption or for repairing wrongful losses that people might suffer in the holdings that such an
allocation provides them.
62. P. 274.
63. Of course, the latter may be partly determined by the former. Threat advantage in bargaining
will be determined by the size of one's holding as well as by one's personal capacity to protect it.
64. P. 287 (footnote omitted).
65. P. 287 (footnote omitted).
66. P. 390 n.14.
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improvement distribution and the post-improvement distribution are
unfair.
V. CONCLUSION
Like all collections of essays, this volume has its unsatisfactory aspects.
The essays do not hang together perfectly,67 and there are both omissions
and repetitions. There are some extensive comments in the endnotes (in-
serted, one presumes, at the editing phase) that-could well have been in-
corporated into the text. And the volume is marred by misprints and by
the lack of an index.
All the same, this is a rich and stimulating volume which repays close
attention. It provides the basis of a rigorous critique of EAL and of the
general claims made for economic method in law and political theory. It
demonstrates the author's considerable command of legal, technical, and
philosophical skills. Above all, it whets the reader's appetite for more sus-
tained presentations of Coleman's views on these topics. In the Preface he
promises us a book called Accidents,68 and in the endnotes another enti-
tled The Market Paradigm.69 Both will be well worth waiting for.
67. The essay on Dworkin's critique of positivism, for example, is quite different in its theme
from all the others.
68. P. xii (footnote omitted).
69. P. 387 n.1.

